[act-ma] CME Thurs.Dec. 13: China Study Group discussion on 18th Party Congress of CCP
Sandra Rosen
sar8 at verizon.net
Tue Dec 11 10:45:22 PST 2012
China Study, Thursday December 13 @ 7 p.m.
Center for Marxist Education, 550 Mass Ave, Cambridge Central Square
"New Chinese leaders take top positions at 18th Congress of Chinese
Communist Party"
Presentation and discussion on China's new leadership and policies at
the most important Chinese political meeting since 2002.
The article below gives perspective of the Western press. Willy Lam
is one of the better informed writers on China. In his terminology,
the predominance of "conservativism" is similar to what I would call
"left-center."
hope to see you,
Duncan
coordinator
JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
18th Party Congress Showcases Stunning Setback to Reform
China Brief, Volume: 12 Issue: 22
November 16, 2012
By: Willy Lam
The most pertinent message of the just-ended 18th Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Congress has perhaps come from Premier Wen Jiabao. This
is despite the fact outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao’s 101-minute
Political Report to the 18th Party Congress (hereafter Report) has
dominated Chinese and international media coverage of the seven-day
mega-event. “We must strengthen and improve the leadership of the
Party,” Wen said while talking to members of the Tianjin delegation
to the Congress, “In particular, we must push forward the reform of
the leadership system of the party and state” (Xinhua, November 9).
It is true that Hu, who remains state president until next March, has
devoted a good part of his Report to political and institutional
reforms. Yet the most important function of the Congress—picking a
new slate of Fifth Generation leaders—has been dominated by old-
fashioned, non-transparent factional intrigue as well as the
resurgence of the influence of long-retired party elders.
That the choice of the members of the 18th Politburo and its seven-
member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), China’s supreme ruling
council, was the result of backroom skullduggery and horse-trading
was evident from the first few minutes of the Congress’s opening
ceremony at the Great Hall of the People. First to appear before the
cameras was the 69-year-old Hu, who was followed closely by the 86-
year-old ex-President Jiang Zemin. A distance of several meters
separated these two putative “cores,” respectively, of the Third- and
Fourth-Generation leadership collectives on the one hand, and two
other groups on the other: the out-going members of the 17th PBSC and
long-retired PBSC members. The oldest member of the latter group was
Song Ping, 95, the one-time CCP organization czar who left the PBSC
20 years ago (Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], November 9; Apple Daily [Hong
Kong], November 9).
The appearance of the octogenarian and nonagenarian cadres was not
just a symbolic gesture to demonstrate party unity. At least a couple
of these past state leaders have played the role of kingmaker in the
choice of PBSC members this year. For example, three of the seven
members of the 18th PBSC are believed to be protégés of Jiang, who
still heads the Shanghai Faction in party politics. They are new
General Secretary Xi Jinping, who owed his promotion to the PBSC in
2007 to Jiang’s nomination; the soon-to-be-named Chairman of the
National People’s Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang; and the Executive
Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat Liu Yunshan. Jiang and
former Premier Li Peng, 84, were instrumental in preventing two of
Hu’s cronies, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, from making it to the PBSC.
Both Li and Wang, who have reformist reputations, have managed only
to hang on to their Politburo seats. Wang, age 57, the outgoing Party
Secretary of Guangdong Province, is set to become a vice premier in
March (Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 8; Sing Tao Daily [Hong
Kong], November 8).
As in his Political Report to the 17th Party Congress of 2007,
President Hu last Thursday, November 8, devoted two long paragraphs
to “democracy within the party” (dangnei minzhu) as well as reforming
the party’s personnel system—particularly fairer and more transparent
ways for picking leaders. For example, Hu said the authorities must
substantiate party members’ “right to know, right to take part [in
party deliberations], electoral rights and supervisory rights.”
Regarding the selection of senior cadres, Hu indicated the party must
“comprehensively and correctly implement democratic, open,
competitive and meritorious” goals. While discussing the issues of
leadership five years ago, President Hu, however, laid emphasis on
systems of “democratic centralism and collective leadership” and
indicated the party must “oppose and prevent dictatorial [practices]
by individuals or a minority [of leaders].” There were no more
references to the dictatorial practices of strongman-like figures in
this year’s report (Xinhua, November 8; People’s Daily, October 25,
2007). Hu’s failure to lash out at the apparent resumption of Mao-
style “rule of personality” could reflect his frustration at the
machinations of the likes of Jiang Zemin in the past few months.
It is in this context that Wen’s comment on the “reform of the
leadership system of the party and state” seems as timely as it is
hard hitting. Although Wen has in the past two to three years made
dozens of appeals to speeding up political reform, including
upholding the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping’s edicts on the subject,
this was the first time that he made an indirect, but obvious,
reference to one of the most celebrated speeches of the chief
architect of reform. In a 1980 address entitled “On the Reform of the
System of Party and State Leadership,” Deng cited the following
daunting obstacles to political and institutional liberalization:
“bureaucracy, over-concentration of power, patriarchal methods, life
tenure in leading posts and privileges of various kinds.” Deng had
this to say about the party’s “patriarchal” traditions: “Besides
leading to over-concentration of power in the hands of individuals,
patriarchal ways within the revolutionary ranks place individuals
above the organization, which then becomes a tool in their
hands” (People’s Daily, August 18, 1980). While there is no concrete
evidence to show that Wen was zeroing in on the recent activities of
patriarchs such as Jiang, his comments made to Tianjin Congress
deputies were omitted inexplicably from CCTV’s evening news last
Thursday. Xinhua News Agency also only reported his remarks one day
later. Remarks made by other PBSC members during group discussions of
provincial or municipal delegates, however, were publicized within
hours by the official media (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], November 10; Hong
Kong Economic Journal, November 10; CCTV News, November 8).
Fighting graft is another area where the Hu report seems to have
fallen short. Hu echoed warnings sounded by ex-president Jiang in the
late 1990s that the party’s failure to eradicate endemic corruption
could “deal a body blow to the party and even lead to the collapse of
the party and country.” “We must never slacken in fighting graft and
in building clean governance,” he warned, “The alarm bells must be
rung unceasingly.” Yet Hu has failed to introduce new measures such
as party regulations requiring all senior cadres to publicize the
assets of their close relatives—and to disclose whether the latter
have foreign residency status. It is also significant that while
reading out his speech, Hu omitted this clause that was in the
printed version: “Senior cadres must not only discipline themselves
stringently but also strengthen the education of and constraints over
their relatives and close associates” (Xinhua, November 8; CableTV
News [Hong Kong], November 8).
In the run-up to the Party Congress, Bloomberg and the New York Times
have published detailed reports about the business activities of the
relatives of Vice President Xi and Premier Wen. Despite immediate
action taken by state censors to block these articles from Chinese
cyberspace, millions of netizens are believed to have read them.
While Hu’s warnings about the exacerbation of graft could be the
party’s answer to growing criticisms about greed in high places, no
investigations are believed to have been launched on the well-
publicized business activities of the close kin of top officials.
This is despite the fact that while participating in discussions
among provincial and municipal deputies to the Congress, top cadres
such as Wang Yang and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng claimed
effective steps had been taken to prevent their relatives from
improperly making money (IFeng.com [Beijing], November 9; Hong Kong
Economic Times, November 9).
In the Report, Hu also touched upon ways to restructure the economy.
Reiterating that China’s growth had been “unbalanced, uncoordinated
and unsustainable,” the president vowed to “comprehensively deepen
the reform of the economic structure.” He called on party cadres to
pay more attention to indigenous innovation and, in particular, to
boost consumer spending as a new pillar of GDP expansion. Perhaps due
to the conviction that the CCP’s status as “perennial ruling party”
is contingent upon the party-state apparatus’ tight control over
major chunks of the economy, Hu indicated Beijing must “unwaveringly
consolidate and develop the public sector of the economy.” Hu went
further, adding “[We should] invest more state capital in major
industries in key fields that comprise the lifeline of the economy
and are vital to national security.” The Report contradicts the
concerns of renowned economists, such as Mao Yushi of Beijing’s
Unirule Research Institute, who have deplored the trend of “the state
sector advances even as the private sector retreats” (guojin mintui)
(Sohu.com [Beijing], November 1; Sina.com [Beijing], July 12).
Moreover, Premier Wen recently had pledged to give more support to
embattled private companies: “We must complete and implement policies
and measures aimed at promoting the development of the non-state
economy, break [state] monopolies and lower industry thresholds for
new entrants” (People’s Daily, November 1; China News Service, July 16).
On the eve of the Congress, observers speculated the Hu-led
leadership might signal its willingness to contemplate liberalization
by removing Mao Zedong Thought, which is synonymous with
conservatism, from the CCP Constitution. After all, it seems almost
certain that disgraced Politburo member Bo Xilai, who spearheaded a
vigorous campaign to revive Maoism, will be given a stiff prison term
after his recent expulsion from the party. The only major
constitutional revision approved by the Congress, however, was to
elevate the “Scientific Development Concept” (kexue fazhan guan)
which is Hu Jintao’s contribution to CCP canon, to the status of
“guiding principle” of the party and state. This has put the
“Scientific Development Concept” on the same level as ex-President
Jiang’s “Important Thinking of the Three Represents” (san ge daibiao
zhongyao sixiang) (Ming Pao, November 8).
In his Report, Hu urged party cadres and members to work harder at
“innovation of the implementation [of policies], theoretical
innovations, and the innovation of institutions.” Yet he also
repeated this same point that he made five years ago: “While [the
party] will not go down the old road of ossification, it will also
avoid devious paths that will change the flag and standard [of
socialist orthodoxy].” Given the predominance of conservatism in the
Report—and the Byzantine fashion in which the new corps of leaders
has been chosen—it seems unlikely that the leadership under General
Secretary Xi Jinping will push reformist goals and policies in the
foreseeable future.
__._,_.___
Upcoming event:
Samia Halaby, Saturday, December 15 @ 3 p.m.
“My experience as the first artist invited from the US in Cuba’s
3rd Havana Biennial”
Samia Halaby, a Palestinian artist now living in NY, discusses her
experience in Cuba, a state where the working class took power. She
examines differences between the bourgeoisie's Venice Biennale of
1988 and the Havana Biennial of 1989. The presentation also provides
background on abstraction and its sources in revolution, and
contrasts it with the idealism behind current, very retrograde,
capitalist painting.
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