[act-ma] Full Statement of Bradley Manning to the Military Court [transcribed and provided by Alexa O'Brien...]

[James in Cambridge]

 [Kevin Zeese, and activist (and former Green Party candidate in the Washington, D.C. area)  forwarded this text and I am passing it along.   James "in cambridge"                             ]

The court has not allowed the release of the statement.But here is a full transcript produced by Alexa O'Brien, http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement.html.  She only missed a few words.


Below is a summary of key portions (still long excerpts).Please share and urge others to.KZ
Highlights from Manning Statement


February 23, 2013

Full statement: http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement.html



I felt that we were
risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading
to frustration and anger on both sides. I began to become depressed with the
situation that we found ourselves increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs
documented this in great detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on
the ground.’



In attempting to conduct
counter-terrorism or CT and counter-insurgency COIN operations we became
obsessed with capturing and killing human targets on lists and not being
suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and
ignoring the second and third order effects of accomplishing short-term goals
and missions. I believe that if the general public, especially the American
public, had access to the information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
tables this could spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our
foreign policy in general as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and
Afghanistan.

I also believed the
detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time by different sectors
of society might cause society to reevaluate the need or even the desire to
even to engage in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that ignore
the complex dynamics of the people living in the effected environment everyday.

 * 
*  *

 I first called my local news paper, The Washington Post,
and spoke with a woman saying that she was a reporter. I asked her if the
Washington Post would be interested in receiving information that would have
enormous value to the American public.

Although
we spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of what I
possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me that the Washington
Post would possibly be interested, but that such decisions were made only after
seeing the information I was referring to and after consideration by senior
editors.

I
then decided to contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, The New York
Times. I called the public editor number on The New York Times website. The
phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the menu to the
section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I left a message
stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan that I believed
was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype phone number and personal
email address, I never received a reply from The New York Times.

* 
*  *

At my aunts house I joined in on
an IRC conversation and stated I had information that needed to be shared with
the world. I wrote that the information would help document the true cost of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to
describe the information. However, before I could describe the information
another individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online
submission system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one
more time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SigActs.

On
3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer and clicked on the
submit documents link. Next I found the submit your information online link and
elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router or TOR anonymizing network
by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide anonymity online. The
software routes internet traffic through a network of servers and other TOR
clients in order to conceal the user's location and identity.

* 
*  *

 I attached a text file I drafted while
preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It provided rough
guidelines saying 'It's already been sanitized of any source identifying
information. You might need to sit on this information-- perhaps 90 to 100 days
to figure out how best to release such a large amount of data and to protect
its source. This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time
removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century
asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.'

 

After sending this, I left the SD
card in a camera case at my aunt's house in the event I needed it again in the
future. I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the
information had not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief
by them having it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have
a clear conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were
happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.

 

* 
*  *

I also began scanning the
database and reading other random cables that piqued my curiosity. It was
around this time-- in early to mid-January of 2010, that I began searching the
database for information on Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to the
IRC conversations I viewed in the WLO channel discussing an issue called
Icesave. At this time I was not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to
be a big issue for those participating in the conversation. This is when I
decided to investigate and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.

At
the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either directly
or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for Icesave. I then
learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of one or more of Iceland's
banks. According to open source reporting much of the public controversy
involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism legislation against Iceland
in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment of the guarantees for UK
depositors that lost money.

Shortly
after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric Diplomacy
portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave as the topic had not
abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the
cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the Icesave issue directly.

The
cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over two pages in length. I read
the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially being bullied
diplomatically by two larger European powers. It appeared to me that Iceland
was out viable options and was coming to the US for assistance. Despite the
quiet request for assistance, it did not appear that we were going to do
anything.

From
my perspective it appeared that we were not getting involved due to the lack of
long term geopolitical benefit to do so. After digesting the contents of 10
Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was something I should send to the WLO. At
this point the WLO had not published or acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and
CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing that the SigActs were a priority for the
WLO, I decided the cable was something that would be important. I felt
that I would be able to right a wrong by having them publish this document. 

* 
*  *

Collateral Murder Video

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the
tragedy and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of
the video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally.

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy
and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the
video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally. . . .

 I planned to keep this information there until I redeployed in Summer
2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters office in London to assist
them in preventing events such as this in the future. . . .

The WLO released the video on 5
April 2010. After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and
how it would been received by the general public.

I
hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me about the conduct of the aerial
weapons team crew members. I wanted the American public to know that not everyone
in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be neutralized, but rather
people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what
we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response
in the media and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team video. As
I hoped, others were just as troubled-- if not more troubled that me by what
they saw.

At
this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the Department of Defense an
CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the video. Additionally, one of
my supervisors, Captain
Casey Fulton, stated her belief that the video was not
authentic. In her response, I decided to ensure that the authenticity of the
video would not be questioned in the future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed
Captain Fulton, a link to the video that was on our 'T' drive, and a copy of
the video published by WLO that was collected by the open source center, so she
could compare them herself.

Around
this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW containing the aerial weapons team
video. In order to made it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker
and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my
personal CD cases containing a set of 'Starting Out in Arabic CD's.' I planned
on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our re-deployment, so they could have
a copy that was unquestionably authentic.

* 
*  *

Conversations with Wikileaks in Chat Room


 I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an
important submission. I received a response from an individual going by the
handle of 'ox'-- at first our conversations were general in nature, but over
time as our conversations progressed, I accessed this individual to be an
important part of the WLO.

Due
to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged identifying
information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. Julian Assange
[he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel Schmidt, or a proxy
representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.

As
the communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave 'ox' and
later 'pressassociation' the name of Nathaniel Frank in my address book, after
the author of a book I read in 2009.

After
a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly relationship with
Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology and politics made our
conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation often. Sometimes as long as
an hour or more. I often looked forward to my conversations with Nathaniel
after work.

The
anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO's policy
allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social
labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. In real
life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I worked with in my section,
the S2 section.

In
my section, the S2 section supported battalions and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team
as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate to his
discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over the next few months,
I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on nearly a daily
basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.

Conversations
covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about pretty much
everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was working on. In
retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more by myself
than Nathaniel. For me these conversations represented an opportunity to escape
from the immense pressures and anxiety that I experienced and built up through
out the deployment. It seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more
I seemed to alienate my peers and lose respect, trust, and support I needed.

* 
*  *

. . . documents related to the
detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the Detainee Assessment
Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army Counter Intelligence Center report.

On
27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion. The
report described an event in which the Federal Police or FP detained 15
individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I received
instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to investigate the matter,
and figure out who the quote 'bad guys' unquote were and how significant this
event was for the Federal Police.

Over
the course of my research I found that none of the individuals had previous
ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. A few hours
later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene-- from this subordinate
battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a different team on the
S2 section and she forwarded them to me.

These
photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted paper and
seized copies of the final printed material or the printed document; and a high
resolution photo of the printed material itself. I printed up one [missed word]
copy of a high resolution photo-- I laminated it for ease of use and transfer.
I then walked to the TOC and delivered the laminated copy to our category two
interpreter.

She
reviewed the information and about a half and hour later delivered a rough
written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the transcript and
followed up with her, asking her for her take on the content. She said it was
easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up the photograph and
laminated it. She said the general nature of the document was benign. The
document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a scholarly critique of the then
current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It
detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government and the
financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi people. After discovering this
discrepancy between the Federal Police's report and the interpreter's
transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and the battle NCOIC. The
top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed me that they didn't need or
want to know this information anymore. They told me to quote "drop
it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal Police in finding out,
where more of these print shops creating quote' anti-Iraqi literature' unquote.

I
couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the T-SCIF and complained to
the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what happened. Some were
sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.

I
am the type of person who likes to know how things work. And, as an analyst,
this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other analysts in my
section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not
satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing canned or cookie
cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what
we could to correct or mitigate a situation.

I
knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in identifying
the political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those people would be
arrested and in the custody of the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police
and very likely tortured and not seen again for a very long time-- if ever.

Instead
of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to take
the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that before the upcoming
7 March 2010 election, they could generate some immediate press on the issue
and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from continuing to crack down in
political opponents of al-Maliki. . . . on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel
over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information
to confirm the event in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the
international media.

I attempted to provide the
specifics, but to my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this
information. 

 

* 
*  *

 

 I began sifting through information from the US Southern
Command or SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The
thought occurred to me-- although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the
individuals detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US
custody-- and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

As
I digested through the information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I quickly
found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I previously came across the
document's before in 2009 but did not think much about them. However, this time
I was more curious in this search and I found them again.

The
DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the commander
US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background information about a
detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force Guantanamo. I have always been
interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint
Task Force Guantanamo. On the one hand, I have always understood the need to
detain and interrogate individuals who might wish to harm the United States and
our allies, however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo.

However,
the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found ourselves
holding an increasing number of individuals indefinitely that we believed or
knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers that did not have useful
intelligence and would be released if they were still held in theater.

I
also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack Obama,
stated that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the facility
compromised our standing over all, and diminished our quote 'moral authority'
unquote.

After
familiarizing myself with the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading
through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I noticed that they were not analytical
products, instead they contained summaries of tear line versions of interim
intelligence reports that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs contained
the names of sources or quotes from tactical interrogation reports or TIR's.
Since the DABs were being sent to the US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that
they were intended to provide very general background information on each of
the detainees and not a detailed assessment.

In
addition to the manner in which the DAB's were written, I recognized that they
were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that were already
released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I determined that the
DAB's were not very important fro either an intelligence or a national security
standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I
asked him if he thought the DAB's were of any use to anyone.

Nathaniel
indicated, although he did not believe that they were of political
significance, he did believe that they could be used to merge into the general
historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. He also
thought that the DAB's might be helpful to the legal counsel of those currently
and previously held at JTF-GTMO.

After
this discussion, I decided to download the data. I used an application called
Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off of the NIPRnet laptop in the
T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW, and placed the
executable in my 'My Documents' directory on my user profile, on the D6-A
SIPRnet workstation.

* 
*  *

 

Over the next few weeks I did not send any
additional information to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over
the Jabber client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending
documents to WLO, no one associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more
information. The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the
WLO and the website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for
my actions.

 

*  *  *

State Department Cables

One 22 March 2010, I downloaded
two documents. I found these documents over the course of my normal duties as
an analysts. Based on my training and the guidance of my superiors, I look at
as much information as possible.

Doings
so provided me with the ability to make connections that others might miss. On
several occasions during the month of March, I accessed information from a
Government entity. I read several documents from a section within this
Government entity. The content of two of these documents upset me greatly. I
had difficulty believing what this section was doing.

In late March of 2010, I received
a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel, that the WLO website would be publishing
the aerial weapons team video. He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and
the frequency and intensity of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly.
During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.

I
read more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State Net
Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in geopolitics I
became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables on Iraq, but also about
countries and events that I found interesting.

The
more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with other
nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented backdoor deals
and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem characteristic of the de facto
leader of the free world. . . .



The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that this was the
type of information that should become public. I once read a and used a quote
on open diplomacy written after the First World War and how the world would be
a better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with and
against each other.

I
thought these cables were a prime example of a need for a more open diplomacy.
Given all of the Department of State cables that I read, the fact that most of
the cables were unclassified, and that all the cables have a SIPDIS caption.

I
believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the United
States, however, I did believe that the cables might be embarrassing, since
they represented very honest opinions and statements behind the backs of other
nations and organizations.

In
many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I believed
exposing this information might make some within the Department of State and
other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began downloading a copy
of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described above.

*  *  *

Garani, Farah
Province Afghanistan Slaughter 

In late March 2010, I discovered
a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching
CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As described above, this was something that
myself and other officers did on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident
and what happened. The airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah
Province, Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during
the time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians-- mostly
women and children-- were accidentally killed during the airstrike.

After
going through the report and the [missed word] annexes, I began to review the
incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team engagements
in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably different in that it involved a
significantly higher number of individuals, larger aircraft and much heavier
munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report are more disturbing than those
of the July 2007 incident.

I
did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave away sensitive
information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions were-- what those
involved should have done, and how to avoid an event like this from occurring
again.

 

 

 Highlights from Manning Statement

February 23, 2013

Full statement: http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement.html


I felt that we were
risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading
to frustration and anger on both sides. I began to become depressed with the
situation that we found ourselves increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs
documented this in great detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on
the ground.’

In attempting to conduct
counter-terrorism or CT and counter-insurgency COIN operations we became
obsessed with capturing and killing human targets on lists and not being
suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and
ignoring the second and third order effects of accomplishing short-term goals
and missions. I believe that if the general public, especially the American
public, had access to the information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
tables this could spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our
foreign policy in general as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and
Afghanistan.

I also believed the
detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time by different sectors
of society might cause society to reevaluate the need or even the desire to
even to engage in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that ignore
the complex dynamics of the people living in the effected environment everyday.

 * 
*  *

 I first called my local news paper, The Washington Post,
and spoke with a woman saying that she was a reporter. I asked her if the
Washington Post would be interested in receiving information that would have
enormous value to the American public.

Although
we spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of what I
possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me that the Washington
Post would possibly be interested, but that such decisions were made only after
seeing the information I was referring to and after consideration by senior
editors.

I
then decided to contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, The New York
Times. I called the public editor number on The New York Times website. The
phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the menu to the
section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I left a message
stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan that I believed
was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype phone number and personal
email address, I never received a reply from The New York Times.

* 
*  *

At my aunts house I joined in on
an IRC conversation and stated I had information that needed to be shared with
the world. I wrote that the information would help document the true cost of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to
describe the information. However, before I could describe the information
another individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online
submission system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one
more time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SigActs.

On
3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer and clicked on the
submit documents link. Next I found the submit your information online link and
elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router or TOR anonymizing network
by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide anonymity online. The
software routes internet traffic through a network of servers and other TOR
clients in order to conceal the user's location and identity.

* 
*  *

 I attached a text file I drafted while
preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It provided rough
guidelines saying 'It's already been sanitized of any source identifying
information. You might need to sit on this information-- perhaps 90 to 100 days
to figure out how best to release such a large amount of data and to protect
its source. This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time
removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century
asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.'

 

After sending this, I left the SD
card in a camera case at my aunt's house in the event I needed it again in the
future. I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the
information had not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief
by them having it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have
a clear conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were
happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.

 

* 
*  *

I also began scanning the
database and reading other random cables that piqued my curiosity. It was
around this time-- in early to mid-January of 2010, that I began searching the
database for information on Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to the
IRC conversations I viewed in the WLO channel discussing an issue called
Icesave. At this time I was not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to
be a big issue for those participating in the conversation. This is when I
decided to investigate and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.

At
the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either directly
or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for Icesave. I then
learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of one or more of Iceland's
banks. According to open source reporting much of the public controversy
involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism legislation against Iceland
in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment of the guarantees for UK
depositors that lost money.

Shortly
after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric Diplomacy
portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave as the topic had not
abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the
cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the Icesave issue directly.

The
cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over two pages in length. I read
the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially being bullied
diplomatically by two larger European powers. It appeared to me that Iceland
was out viable options and was coming to the US for assistance. Despite the
quiet request for assistance, it did not appear that we were going to do
anything.

From
my perspective it appeared that we were not getting involved due to the lack of
long term geopolitical benefit to do so. After digesting the contents of 10
Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was something I should send to the WLO. At
this point the WLO had not published or acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and
CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing that the SigActs were a priority for the
WLO, I decided the cable was something that would be important. I felt
that I would be able to right a wrong by having them publish this document. 

* 
*  *

Collateral Murder Video

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the
tragedy and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of
the video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally.

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy
and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the
video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally. . . .

 I planned to keep this information there until I redeployed in Summer
2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters office in London to assist
them in preventing events such as this in the future. . . .

The WLO released the video on 5
April 2010. After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and
how it would been received by the general public.

I
hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me about the conduct of the aerial
weapons team crew members. I wanted the American public to know that not everyone
in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be neutralized, but rather
people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what
we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response
in the media and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team video. As
I hoped, others were just as troubled-- if not more troubled that me by what
they saw.

At
this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the Department of Defense an
CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the video. Additionally, one of
my supervisors, Captain
Casey Fulton, stated her belief that the video was not
authentic. In her response, I decided to ensure that the authenticity of the
video would not be questioned in the future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed
Captain Fulton, a link to the video that was on our 'T' drive, and a copy of
the video published by WLO that was collected by the open source center, so she
could compare them herself.

Around
this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW containing the aerial weapons team
video. In order to made it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker
and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my
personal CD cases containing a set of 'Starting Out in Arabic CD's.' I planned
on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our re-deployment, so they could have
a copy that was unquestionably authentic.

* 
*  *

Conversations with Wikileaks in Chat Room


 I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an
important submission. I received a response from an individual going by the
handle of 'ox'-- at first our conversations were general in nature, but over
time as our conversations progressed, I accessed this individual to be an
important part of the WLO.

Due
to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged identifying
information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. Julian Assange
[he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel Schmidt, or a proxy
representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.

As
the communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave 'ox' and
later 'pressassociation' the name of Nathaniel Frank in my address book, after
the author of a book I read in 2009.

After
a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly relationship with
Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology and politics made our
conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation often. Sometimes as long as
an hour or more. I often looked forward to my conversations with Nathaniel
after work.

The
anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO's policy
allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social
labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. In real
life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I worked with in my section,
the S2 section.

In
my section, the S2 section supported battalions and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team
as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate to his
discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over the next few months,
I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on nearly a daily
basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.

Conversations
covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about pretty much
everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was working on. In
retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more by myself
than Nathaniel. For me these conversations represented an opportunity to escape
from the immense pressures and anxiety that I experienced and built up through
out the deployment. It seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more
I seemed to alienate my peers and lose respect, trust, and support I needed.

* 
*  *

. . . documents related to the
detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the Detainee Assessment
Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army Counter Intelligence Center report.

On
27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion. The
report described an event in which the Federal Police or FP detained 15
individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I received
instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to investigate the matter,
and figure out who the quote 'bad guys' unquote were and how significant this
event was for the Federal Police.

Over
the course of my research I found that none of the individuals had previous
ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. A few hours
later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene-- from this subordinate
battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a different team on the
S2 section and she forwarded them to me.

These
photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted paper and
seized copies of the final printed material or the printed document; and a high
resolution photo of the printed material itself. I printed up one [missed word]
copy of a high resolution photo-- I laminated it for ease of use and transfer.
I then walked to the TOC and delivered the laminated copy to our category two
interpreter.

She
reviewed the information and about a half and hour later delivered a rough
written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the transcript and
followed up with her, asking her for her take on the content. She said it was
easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up the photograph and
laminated it. She said the general nature of the document was benign. The
document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a scholarly critique of the then
current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It
detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government and the
financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi people. After discovering this
discrepancy between the Federal Police's report and the interpreter's
transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and the battle NCOIC. The
top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed me that they didn't need or
want to know this information anymore. They told me to quote "drop
it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal Police in finding out,
where more of these print shops creating quote' anti-Iraqi literature' unquote.

I
couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the T-SCIF and complained to
the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what happened. Some were
sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.

I
am the type of person who likes to know how things work. And, as an analyst,
this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other analysts in my
section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not
satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing canned or cookie
cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what
we could to correct or mitigate a situation.

I
knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in identifying
the political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those people would be
arrested and in the custody of the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police
and very likely tortured and not seen again for a very long time-- if ever.

Instead
of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to take
the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that before the upcoming
7 March 2010 election, they could generate some immediate press on the issue
and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from continuing to crack down in
political opponents of al-Maliki. . . . on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel
over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information
to confirm the event in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the
international media.

I attempted to provide the
specifics, but to my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this
information. 

 

* 
*  *

 

 I began sifting through information from the US Southern
Command or SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The
thought occurred to me-- although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the
individuals detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US
custody-- and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

As
I digested through the information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I quickly
found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I previously came across the
document's before in 2009 but did not think much about them. However, this time
I was more curious in this search and I found them again.

The
DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the commander
US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background information about a
detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force Guantanamo. I have always been
interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint
Task Force Guantanamo. On the one hand, I have always understood the need to
detain and interrogate individuals who might wish to harm the United States and
our allies, however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo.

However,
the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found ourselves
holding an increasing number of individuals indefinitely that we believed or
knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers that did not have useful
intelligence and would be released if they were still held in theater.

I
also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack Obama,
stated that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the facility
compromised our standing over all, and diminished our quote 'moral authority'
unquote.

After
familiarizing myself with the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading
through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I noticed that they were not analytical
products, instead they contained summaries of tear line versions of interim
intelligence reports that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs contained
the names of sources or quotes from tactical interrogation reports or TIR's.
Since the DABs were being sent to the US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that
they were intended to provide very general background information on each of
the detainees and not a detailed assessment.

In
addition to the manner in which the DAB's were written, I recognized that they
were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that were already
released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I determined that the
DAB's were not very important fro either an intelligence or a national security
standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I
asked him if he thought the DAB's were of any use to anyone.

Nathaniel
indicated, although he did not believe that they were of political
significance, he did believe that they could be used to merge into the general
historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. He also
thought that the DAB's might be helpful to the legal counsel of those currently
and previously held at JTF-GTMO.

After
this discussion, I decided to download the data. I used an application called
Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off of the NIPRnet laptop in the
T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW, and placed the
executable in my 'My Documents' directory on my user profile, on the D6-A
SIPRnet workstation.

* 
*  *

 

Over the next few weeks I did not send any
additional information to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over
the Jabber client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending
documents to WLO, no one associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more
information. The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the
WLO and the website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for
my actions.

 

*  *  *

State Department Cables

One 22 March 2010, I downloaded
two documents. I found these documents over the course of my normal duties as
an analysts. Based on my training and the guidance of my superiors, I look at
as much information as possible.

Doings
so provided me with the ability to make connections that others might miss. On
several occasions during the month of March, I accessed information from a
Government entity. I read several documents from a section within this
Government entity. The content of two of these documents upset me greatly. I
had difficulty believing what this section was doing.

In late March of 2010, I received
a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel, that the WLO website would be publishing
the aerial weapons team video. He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and
the frequency and intensity of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly.
During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.

I
read more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State Net
Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in geopolitics I
became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables on Iraq, but also about
countries and events that I found interesting.

The
more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with other
nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented backdoor deals
and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem characteristic of the de facto
leader of the free world. . . .



The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that this was the
type of information that should become public. I once read a and used a quote
on open diplomacy written after the First World War and how the world would be
a better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with and
against each other.

I
thought these cables were a prime example of a need for a more open diplomacy.
Given all of the Department of State cables that I read, the fact that most of
the cables were unclassified, and that all the cables have a SIPDIS caption.

I
believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the United
States, however, I did believe that the cables might be embarrassing, since
they represented very honest opinions and statements behind the backs of other
nations and organizations.

In
many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I believed
exposing this information might make some within the Department of State and
other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began downloading a copy
of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described above.

*  *  *

Garani, Farah
Province Afghanistan Slaughter 

In late March 2010, I discovered
a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching
CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As described above, this was something that
myself and other officers did on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident
and what happened. The airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah
Province, Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during
the time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians-- mostly
women and children-- were accidentally killed during the airstrike.

After
going through the report and the [missed word] annexes, I began to review the
incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team engagements
in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably different in that it involved a
significantly higher number of individuals, larger aircraft and much heavier
munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report are more disturbing than those
of the July 2007 incident.

I
did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave away sensitive
information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions were-- what those
involved should have done, and how to avoid an event like this from occurring
again.

 

 

 Highlights from Manning Statement


February 23, 2013

Full statement: http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement.html


I felt that we were
risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading
to frustration and anger on both sides. I began to become depressed with the
situation that we found ourselves increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs
documented this in great detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on
the ground.’

In attempting to conduct
counter-terrorism or CT and counter-insurgency COIN operations we became
obsessed with capturing and killing human targets on lists and not being
suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and
ignoring the second and third order effects of accomplishing short-term goals
and missions. I believe that if the general public, especially the American
public, had access to the information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
tables this could spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our
foreign policy in general as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and
Afghanistan.

I also believed the
detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time by different sectors
of society might cause society to reevaluate the need or even the desire to
even to engage in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that ignore
the complex dynamics of the people living in the effected environment everyday.

 * 
*  *

 I first called my local news paper, The Washington Post,
and spoke with a woman saying that she was a reporter. I asked her if the
Washington Post would be interested in receiving information that would have
enormous value to the American public.

Although
we spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of what I
possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me that the Washington
Post would possibly be interested, but that such decisions were made only after
seeing the information I was referring to and after consideration by senior
editors.

I
then decided to contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, The New York
Times. I called the public editor number on The New York Times website. The
phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the menu to the
section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I left a message
stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan that I believed
was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype phone number and personal
email address, I never received a reply from The New York Times.

* 
*  *

At my aunts house I joined in on
an IRC conversation and stated I had information that needed to be shared with
the world. I wrote that the information would help document the true cost of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to
describe the information. However, before I could describe the information
another individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online
submission system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one
more time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SigActs.

On
3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer and clicked on the
submit documents link. Next I found the submit your information online link and
elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router or TOR anonymizing network
by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide anonymity online. The
software routes internet traffic through a network of servers and other TOR
clients in order to conceal the user's location and identity.

* 
*  *

 I attached a text file I drafted while
preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It provided rough
guidelines saying 'It's already been sanitized of any source identifying
information. You might need to sit on this information-- perhaps 90 to 100 days
to figure out how best to release such a large amount of data and to protect
its source. This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time
removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century
asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.'

 

After sending this, I left the SD
card in a camera case at my aunt's house in the event I needed it again in the
future. I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the
information had not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief
by them having it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have
a clear conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were
happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.

 

* 
*  *

I also began scanning the
database and reading other random cables that piqued my curiosity. It was
around this time-- in early to mid-January of 2010, that I began searching the
database for information on Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to the
IRC conversations I viewed in the WLO channel discussing an issue called
Icesave. At this time I was not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to
be a big issue for those participating in the conversation. This is when I
decided to investigate and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.

At
the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either directly
or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for Icesave. I then
learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of one or more of Iceland's
banks. According to open source reporting much of the public controversy
involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism legislation against Iceland
in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment of the guarantees for UK
depositors that lost money.

Shortly
after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric Diplomacy
portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave as the topic had not
abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the
cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the Icesave issue directly.

The
cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over two pages in length. I read
the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially being bullied
diplomatically by two larger European powers. It appeared to me that Iceland
was out viable options and was coming to the US for assistance. Despite the
quiet request for assistance, it did not appear that we were going to do
anything.

From
my perspective it appeared that we were not getting involved due to the lack of
long term geopolitical benefit to do so. After digesting the contents of 10
Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was something I should send to the WLO. At
this point the WLO had not published or acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and
CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing that the SigActs were a priority for the
WLO, I decided the cable was something that would be important. I felt
that I would be able to right a wrong by having them publish this document. 

* 
*  *

Collateral Murder Video

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the
tragedy and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of
the video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally.

The video depicted several
individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not
consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type
videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial
weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo
truck troubled me.

As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the
video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in
the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some
research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was
any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using
Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the
aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had
requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA.
Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and
to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy
and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the
video.

Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM
replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for
considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with FOIA.

The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the
event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters
employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were
merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a
threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to
me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The
dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human
life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point
in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical
attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally
asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to
engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.

While
saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I
was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the
wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the
individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on
the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly
after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene.
Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their
fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children
or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons
team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving
over a body-- or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an
article discussing the book, The
Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In
Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an
online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event
belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel
in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It
is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during
his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of
the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an
individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him
and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the
Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of
assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle
finger.

The
individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think
of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds
he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life,
he continues to express his friendly gesture-- only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am
left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens
me emotionally. . . .

 I planned to keep this information there until I redeployed in Summer
2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters office in London to assist
them in preventing events such as this in the future. . . .

The WLO released the video on 5
April 2010. After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and
how it would been received by the general public.

I
hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me about the conduct of the aerial
weapons team crew members. I wanted the American public to know that not everyone
in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be neutralized, but rather
people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what
we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response
in the media and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team video. As
I hoped, others were just as troubled-- if not more troubled that me by what
they saw.

At
this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the Department of Defense an
CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the video. Additionally, one of
my supervisors, Captain
Casey Fulton, stated her belief that the video was not
authentic. In her response, I decided to ensure that the authenticity of the
video would not be questioned in the future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed
Captain Fulton, a link to the video that was on our 'T' drive, and a copy of
the video published by WLO that was collected by the open source center, so she
could compare them herself.

Around
this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW containing the aerial weapons team
video. In order to made it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker
and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my
personal CD cases containing a set of 'Starting Out in Arabic CD's.' I planned
on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our re-deployment, so they could have
a copy that was unquestionably authentic.

* 
*  *

Conversations with Wikileaks in Chat Room


 I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an
important submission. I received a response from an individual going by the
handle of 'ox'-- at first our conversations were general in nature, but over
time as our conversations progressed, I accessed this individual to be an
important part of the WLO.

Due
to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged identifying
information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. Julian Assange
[he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel Schmidt, or a proxy
representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.

As
the communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave 'ox' and
later 'pressassociation' the name of Nathaniel Frank in my address book, after
the author of a book I read in 2009.

After
a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly relationship with
Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology and politics made our
conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation often. Sometimes as long as
an hour or more. I often looked forward to my conversations with Nathaniel
after work.

The
anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO's policy
allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social
labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. In real
life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I worked with in my section,
the S2 section.

In
my section, the S2 section supported battalions and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team
as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate to his
discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over the next few months,
I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on nearly a daily
basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.

Conversations
covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about pretty much
everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was working on. In
retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more by myself
than Nathaniel. For me these conversations represented an opportunity to escape
from the immense pressures and anxiety that I experienced and built up through
out the deployment. It seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more
I seemed to alienate my peers and lose respect, trust, and support I needed.

* 
*  *

. . . documents related to the
detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the Detainee Assessment
Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army Counter Intelligence Center report.

On
27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion. The
report described an event in which the Federal Police or FP detained 15
individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I received
instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to investigate the matter,
and figure out who the quote 'bad guys' unquote were and how significant this
event was for the Federal Police.

Over
the course of my research I found that none of the individuals had previous
ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. A few hours
later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene-- from this subordinate
battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a different team on the
S2 section and she forwarded them to me.

These
photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted paper and
seized copies of the final printed material or the printed document; and a high
resolution photo of the printed material itself. I printed up one [missed word]
copy of a high resolution photo-- I laminated it for ease of use and transfer.
I then walked to the TOC and delivered the laminated copy to our category two
interpreter.

She
reviewed the information and about a half and hour later delivered a rough
written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the transcript and
followed up with her, asking her for her take on the content. She said it was
easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up the photograph and
laminated it. She said the general nature of the document was benign. The
document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a scholarly critique of the then
current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It
detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government and the
financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi people. After discovering this
discrepancy between the Federal Police's report and the interpreter's
transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and the battle NCOIC. The
top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed me that they didn't need or
want to know this information anymore. They told me to quote "drop
it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal Police in finding out,
where more of these print shops creating quote' anti-Iraqi literature' unquote.

I
couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the T-SCIF and complained to
the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what happened. Some were
sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.

I
am the type of person who likes to know how things work. And, as an analyst,
this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other analysts in my
section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not
satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing canned or cookie
cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what
we could to correct or mitigate a situation.

I
knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in identifying
the political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those people would be
arrested and in the custody of the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police
and very likely tortured and not seen again for a very long time-- if ever.

Instead
of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to take
the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that before the upcoming
7 March 2010 election, they could generate some immediate press on the issue
and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from continuing to crack down in
political opponents of al-Maliki. . . . on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel
over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information
to confirm the event in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the
international media.

I attempted to provide the
specifics, but to my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this
information. 

 

* 
*  *

 

 I began sifting through information from the US Southern
Command or SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The
thought occurred to me-- although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the
individuals detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US
custody-- and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

As
I digested through the information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I quickly
found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I previously came across the
document's before in 2009 but did not think much about them. However, this time
I was more curious in this search and I found them again.

The
DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the commander
US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background information about a
detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force Guantanamo. I have always been
interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint
Task Force Guantanamo. On the one hand, I have always understood the need to
detain and interrogate individuals who might wish to harm the United States and
our allies, however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo.

However,
the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found ourselves
holding an increasing number of individuals indefinitely that we believed or
knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers that did not have useful
intelligence and would be released if they were still held in theater.

I
also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack Obama,
stated that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the facility
compromised our standing over all, and diminished our quote 'moral authority'
unquote.

After
familiarizing myself with the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading
through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I noticed that they were not analytical
products, instead they contained summaries of tear line versions of interim
intelligence reports that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs contained
the names of sources or quotes from tactical interrogation reports or TIR's.
Since the DABs were being sent to the US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that
they were intended to provide very general background information on each of
the detainees and not a detailed assessment.

In
addition to the manner in which the DAB's were written, I recognized that they
were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that were already
released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I determined that the
DAB's were not very important fro either an intelligence or a national security
standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I
asked him if he thought the DAB's were of any use to anyone.

Nathaniel
indicated, although he did not believe that they were of political
significance, he did believe that they could be used to merge into the general
historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. He also
thought that the DAB's might be helpful to the legal counsel of those currently
and previously held at JTF-GTMO.

After
this discussion, I decided to download the data. I used an application called
Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off of the NIPRnet laptop in the
T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW, and placed the
executable in my 'My Documents' directory on my user profile, on the D6-A
SIPRnet workstation.

* 
*  *

 

Over the next few weeks I did not send any
additional information to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over
the Jabber client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending
documents to WLO, no one associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more
information. The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the
WLO and the website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for
my actions.

 

*  *  *

State Department Cables

One 22 March 2010, I downloaded
two documents. I found these documents over the course of my normal duties as
an analysts. Based on my training and the guidance of my superiors, I look at
as much information as possible.

Doings
so provided me with the ability to make connections that others might miss. On
several occasions during the month of March, I accessed information from a
Government entity. I read several documents from a section within this
Government entity. The content of two of these documents upset me greatly. I
had difficulty believing what this section was doing.

In late March of 2010, I received
a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel, that the WLO website would be publishing
the aerial weapons team video. He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and
the frequency and intensity of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly.
During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.

I
read more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State Net
Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in geopolitics I
became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables on Iraq, but also about
countries and events that I found interesting.

The
more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with other
nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented backdoor deals
and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem characteristic of the de facto
leader of the free world. . . .



The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that this was the
type of information that should become public. I once read a and used a quote
on open diplomacy written after the First World War and how the world would be
a better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with and
against each other.

I
thought these cables were a prime example of a need for a more open diplomacy.
Given all of the Department of State cables that I read, the fact that most of
the cables were unclassified, and that all the cables have a SIPDIS caption.

I
believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the United
States, however, I did believe that the cables might be embarrassing, since
they represented very honest opinions and statements behind the backs of other
nations and organizations.

In
many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I believed
exposing this information might make some within the Department of State and
other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began downloading a copy
of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described above.

*  *  *

Garani, Farah
Province Afghanistan Slaughter 

In late March 2010, I discovered
a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching
CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As described above, this was something that
myself and other officers did on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident
and what happened. The airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah
Province, Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during
the time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians-- mostly
women and children-- were accidentally killed during the airstrike.

After
going through the report and the [missed word] annexes, I began to review the
incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team engagements
in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably different in that it involved a
significantly higher number of individuals, larger aircraft and much heavier
munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report are more disturbing than those
of the July 2007 incident.

I
did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave away sensitive
information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions were-- what those
involved should have done, and how to avoid an event like this from occurring
again.




 		 	   		  
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